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Notes
Search and Seizure Since Chimel v. California
I. INTRODUCTION
The limited right of search and seizure is predicated on the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.1 The prob-
lem of adequately defining the permissible scope of search in-
cident to a valid arrest has plagued the Supreme Court for many
years. Recently, in Chimel v. California2 the Court vastly
changed the standards used to determine this permissible scope.
One reason for the change was to return search incident to arrest
to its position as an exigency to be used only when it is unreason-
able to require a search warrant to be Qbtained. Another reason
was to limit some of the questionable police practices that had
mushroomed under pre-Chimel standards.
However, in addition to revitalizing fourth amendment pro-
tections, Chimel has engendered problems which did not exist
prior to it. For example, since police could usually search an en-
tire residence incident to arrest prior to Chimel, they were able to
check for possible accomplices on the premises. This enabled
them to protect themselves against possible harm from accom-
plices of the arrestee and aided them in preventing any accom-
plices from destroying evidence. Since Chimel generally pro-
hibits searching every room on the premises, a reassessment of
the methods the police may use to ensure their own protection
and to preserve incriminating evidence has been required. In-
terrelated to this problem is the extent to which the plain sight
doctrine is available to justify searches under the new Chimel
standards. A third area of ambiguity is the effect Chimel was in-
tended to have on searches of automobiles.
It is of great importance that the standards presented in
Chimel be properly understood and interpreted by the courts
and the police so that the public will receive the protection from
unauthorized searches demanded by the Constitution. This Note
will define, as precisely as possible, how the new standards have
1. The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
2. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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affected the permissible scope of search and will examine how
these standards have been implemented by the lower courts.
The protections afforded by Chimel against questionable police
practices will also be investigated and potential problems will be
explored, placing particular emphasis on determining the correct
application of Chimel in the above-mentioned three problem
areas.
II. PRE-CHIMEL STANDARDS AND POLICE PRACTICES
A. THE Harris AND Rabinowitz STANDARDS
Prior to Chimel the permissible scope of search incident to
arrest was governed by the standards established in Harris v.
United States3 and United States v. Rabinowitz.4 These stan-
dards were based on the traditional concept of "control."5  In
Harris, the Court construed "control" to include areas that were
not necessarily under the defendant's "physical control," but
were deemed to be in his "constructive possession." The Rabin-
owitz Court incorporated the Harris standards of "possession"
and "control" 7 and made the reasonableness of the search the cru-
cial factor.8 "Rabinowitz has come to stand for the proposition,
inter alia, that a warrantless search 'incident to a lawful arrest'
may generally extend to the area that is considered to be in the
'possession' or under the 'control' of the person arrested," as
those terms were construed in Harris.9 It thus established that
the absence of the traditional justifications for permitting war-
rantless searches-destruction of the evidence, officer protection
or prevention of the suspect's escape-were not necessarily in-
dicative of an unreasonable search.1 0
3. 331 U.S. 145 (1947). The search in Harris encompassed the
defendant's entire four-room apartment.
4. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). The search in Rabinowitz involved de-
fendant's one-room place of business. Many closed and concealed areas
were searched.
5. The "control" concept was used by the Supreme Court as early
as 1925. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
6. "[T]he area which reasonably may be subjected to search is
not be determined by the fortuitous circumstance that the arrest took
place in the living room as contrasted to some other room of the apart-
ment." 331 U.S. at 152.
7. 339 U.S. at 63.
8. Id. at 66.
9. 395 U.S. at 760. "Rabinowitz [thus] constituted a fundamental
change in fourth amendment theory. . . . [S]earch incident to arrest,
from its position as an historical exception, was brought squarely under
the reasonableness clause of the [fourth] amendment." Comment, 28
U. Cm. L. REv. 664, 684 (1961).
10. This was evident in McCoy v. Cupp, 298 F. Supp. 329, 330 (D.
[Vol. 55:10111012
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Although Harris and Rabinowitz greatly expanded the per-
imissible scope of search over the standards that existed prior
to them,11 their major flaw was not simply expansion but rather
the vagueness of the standards upon which this expansion was
premised. The Supreme Court, in failing to define "reasonable-
ness" and "control," left lower courts with the responsibility of
making decisions without adequate standards for guidance.12
As a result, the area was marked by many inconsistent decisions
and the standards were expanded and distorted to such an ex-
tent as to be of no real value.13
Ore. 1969), wherein the court stated:
Searches incident to lawful arrests are usually justified by the
need to remove evidence or weapons from the suspects' con-
trol ... This reason is not the exclusive justification for
such a search. A search may still be reasonable as incident to
a lawful arrest even though there is no danger that the suspect
will destroy evidence or produce a weapon. . .. Reasonable-
ness, not necessity, is the controlling principle (citations omit-
ted).
11. The Court in Chimel thoroughly analyzed the history of search
and seizure incident to arrest. 395 U.S. at 755-60. In Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), an early but important case in this area, the
Court justified a search of an entire gambling saloon on the grounds
that a lawful arrest had been made. The court said "[the officers]
had a right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in
order to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enter-
prise." 275 U.S. at 199.
. The decision in Marron was based upon the application of property
law concepts. The Court noted that the evidence was not on the
defendant's person at the time of his arrest, but held that it was still
within hi§ immediate possession. That conclusion resulted from de-
fining "possession" to mean "right to control" rather than "actual con-
trol," which is valid for property law purposes, but not from the stand-
point of search and seizure. In his dissenting opinion in Harris, 331 U.S.
145 (1947), Justice Frankfurter stated:
For some purposes, to be sure, a man's house and its contents
are deemed to be in his "possession" or "control" even when
he is miles away. Because this is a mode of legal reasoning
relevant to disputes over property, the usual phrase for such
non-physical control is "constructive possession.' But this mode
of thought and these concepts are irrelevant to the application
of the Fourth Amendment and hostile to respect for the liber-
ties which it protects.
331 U.S. at 164.
12. In Rabinowitz, "reasonableness" in the first instance was said
to be for the district court to determine. 339 U.S. at 63. The Court in
Chimel established its own standard of reasonableness, possibly reacting
to Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Rabinowitz which stated:
-To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some
criterion of reason. . . . It is not for this Court to lay down cri-
teria that the district judges can apply. It is no criterion of
reason to say that the district court must find it reasonable.
Id. at 83.:
13. Particularly illustrative [of the unlimited expansion of the
reasonableness test] was the extension of the concept of "con-
trol" What once was a useful tool became an analytically bank-
rupt concept. All content was negated by the invention of fic-
1971] 1013
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B. PAST POLICE PRACTICES
One effect of this expansion was to increase the number of
searches incident to arrests to where they became more relied
upon by the police than alternative methods of searching.14 The
primary reason is that such a search requires no written forms
and no proof of probable cause before a magistrate prior to the
search and is therefore administratively more convenient. Fur-
thermore, police need not be concerned that a consenting party
will later claim coercion because a search incident to arrest does
not require consent. Consequently, more than 90 percent of all
searches coming to the attention of the courts were incident to
arrests.' 5
Another effect of this expansion was that police had almost
free reign in deciding what would be searched. Searches were
often conducted incident to arrest where an arrest would not
normally be made were it not for the desire to search. Examples
of this practice were arrests made for a minor offense, such as a
traffic violation for which an arrest would not normally be made,
because the officer suspected the person of a more serious of-
fense and wanted to search for possible evidence.'
Furthermore, the "reasonableness" test usually permitted an
extensive search of a residence after an arrest therein, since un-
tions which enabled courts to find "control" in the most unlikely
circumstances: When a suspect is said to "control" his entire
residence simply by placing his key in the outside lock ...
United States v. Beigel, 254 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 370 F.2d
751 (2d Cir. 1967), the concept has clearly lost its ability to distinguish
the justifiable from the unreasonable police search. Note, 17 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 626, 631 (1969).
14. For example, during the years 1956 and 1957, 29 search warrants
were issued in Detroit, approximately 30 in Milwaukee and 17 in
Wichita. The number of search warrants has remained fairly constant
during the years since 1956 and 1957. The frequency of search warrant
usage appears to be much the same in other cities. L. TIFFANY, D. Mc-
INTYRE & D. RoTENBERG, DETECTION OF CrME 100 (1967).
15. Id. at 122.
16. Id. at 123, 131. See, e.g., Fields v. State, 463 P.2d 1000 (Okla.
1969), in which a police officer recognized the defendant when his auto-
mobile approached them from the opposite direction. The officer testi-
fied that he knew the defendant as a "police character." One of the
officers stated that he turned around and noticed that the car had no
license tag light. The police then pulled the defendant over and even
though he got out of his car, the police searched it, finding a gun in the
glove compartment. A traffic citation charging the defendant with im-
proper equipment was dropped. The court, in holding the search in-
valid, noted that the car was new and that when the defendant took It
to a mechanic to have the light repaired he was informed that it was
in working order. See also United States v. Robinson, No. 23,734 (D.C.
Cir. December 3, 1970).
[Vol. 55: 10111014
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der the standards of Harris and Rabinowitz the entire residence
was in the arrestee's "possession" or "control."' 7  Thus "de-
layed" arrests became prevalent. Under this practice officers
delayed arrests until the suspect could be seized in an area the
police wanted to search. This enabled police to make an inci-
dental search rather than having to obtain a warrant.' s By
restricting the permissible scope of search, Chimel has made
many of these dubious practices useless because any evidence
found will not be admitted into evidence.
III. PRESENT STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE
The majority in Chinel also based its decision on the "con-
trol" concept, holding that when an arrest is made, it is reason-
able for the arresting officer to search the suspect's person and
the area "within his immediate control." In employing the term
"immediate," however, the Court narrowed the definition of
"control" by construing it to mean the area from within which the
arrestee may gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
The Court ruled out routinely searching rooms other than those in
which an arrest occurs. It even ruled out searching concealed
areas such as a desk or dresser drawers within that room itself.
The justification for permitting a search incident to an arrest was
the need to protect the police officer from possible harm by the
arrestee who might obtain a weapon and to prevent the arrestee
from destroying evidence.1 9
17. See text accompanying notes 4-10 supra.
18. See, e.g., McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir.
1950). In McKnight the arresting officers' intent to conduct a search in-
cident to the arrest was made abundantly clear by the fact that they
ignored many opportunities to arrest the defendant before he entered
the house which was the object of the search, including the opportunity
to arrest him when he walked directly past an officer stationed in
front of the house. This intentional delay was the key factor in the
court's reversal of McKnight's conviction.
19. 395 U.S. at 763. In defining the new standards the Court men-
tioned the term "reach" as well as the term "immediate control." These
terms are generally synonomous, but unless the term "reach" includes
the concept of "constructive reach," "immediate control" is a broader
concept, since something can be under a person's "immediate control"
without being within his physical '"reach." In this Note, the term "im-
mediate control" will be used, except when the term "reach" is men-
tioned by a court.
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHIMEL BY THE
LOWER COURTS
A. EFFECT ON LOWER COURT DECISIONS
In Derouen v. Sheriff,20 a case which illustrates how Chimel
has altered the permissible scope of search, the defendant was
arrested while sitting on his living room divan. The police
searched the entire apartment incident to the arrest. Narcotics
were found in a bedroom closet and dresser drawer, in the bath-
room medicine cabinet and on the living room divan where the
defendant remained seated during the search. While holding
the evidence admissible under the Rabinowitz test, the court
stated that under Chimel all of the evidence found would not have
been admissible,21 with the possible exception of evidence
found on the divan which may have been within the defendant's
immediate control.22
In a number of cases Chimel has caused entire searches to be
held invalid and the evidence seized inadmissible. For example,
a search of a light fixture which turned up a cache of marijuana
was held illegal because the fixture was outside of the area of
defendant's immediate control. 23 The seizure of marijuana hid-
den in a toothbrush container was held to be illegal because the
arrest took place in the living room, and the container was hidden
in a kitchen cabinet which was not within the defendant's reach. 2'1
The seizure of a boat trailer and outboard motor which officers
observed through a crack in the garage door was held illegal be-
cause the defendants were arrested inside the house and outside
the front door respectively, and the garage was not within the
area of their immediate control. 25
B. CRITERIA USED BY THE LOWER COURTS TO DETERMINE
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE
In order to determine whether the area searched was within
the immediate control of the person arrested each of these
20. 461 P.2d 865 (Nev. 1969).
21. This court did not hold Chimel retroactive in effect. The Su-
preme Court did not state whether Chimel was to be retroactively ap-
plied to searches which took place before it was decided. The majority
of courts have held it prospective in effect; see, e.g., United States v.
Bennett, 415 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1969).
22. 461 P.2d at 867.
23. State v. Rhodes, 80 N.M. 729, 460 P.2d 259 (1969).
24. Fresneda v. State, 458 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1969).
25. Ashby v. State, 228 So. 2d 400 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).
1016 [Vol. 55:1011
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courts had to employ certain criteria. These included, for ex-
ample, the size of the room, whether the arrestee was handcuffed
or otherwise subdued, the size and type of the evidence, the num-
ber of people arrested and the number of officers present. The
criteria used in each case will depend on the facts of the particu-
lar case, but the standards to which these criteria will be applied
remain the same-the search must be limited to the area of de-
fendant's immediate control, construing that phrase to mean the
area from within which the arrestee may obtain a weapon or
destructible evidence. If, for example, the evidence were in a
locked suitcase and the arrestee was handcuffed to his bed, the
evidence would probably not be within his immediate control.
If he was not handcuffed, however, and if the suitcase was open,
it may be considered to be within his immediate control. The re-
sult would depend on other criteria, e.g., the number of police
present and his distance from the suitcase. Thus, a mechanical
application of the new standards will not adequately solve the
problem. 26
For example, in Holmes v. State,27 the court held that evi-
dence found within a distance of approximately eight feet from
where the defendant was sitting when he was arrested was ad-
missible because the evidence was limited to the "area within
[defendant's] immediate control."28  The problem with this de-
cision is that whether the evidence was in fact within defen-
26. In Scott v. State, 7 Md. App. 505, 256 A.2d 384 (1969), a case
in which Chimel was not accorded retroactive effect, the defendant was
arrested in his bedroom pursuant to an arrest warrant for possession of
narcotics. A search incident to the arrest was made in the bedroom and
evidence was discovered in the pockets of two jackets--one on the bed
and the other on the back of the bedroom door. The court held the
seizure was valid, because "reasonable," since the evidence was in the
defendant's control as that phrase had been construed prior to Chimel.
However, it noted:
[A]s the search is tested by its reasonableness and its scope isjustified by the need to protect the arresting officer and to
prevent the destruction of evidence, we cannot construe Chimel
to mean that the area is confined to that precise spot which is
at arm length from the arrestee at the moment of his arrest
He may well lunge forward or move backward or to the side
and thus into an area in which he might grab a weapon or
evidentiary items then within his reach before the officer could,
by the exercise of reasonable diligence, restrain him. We
think that Chimel requires that the State show that the search
was conducted and items were seized in an area "within the
reach" of the arrestee in this concept, as for example, by evi-
dence as to the location of the items with respect to the where-
abouts of the arrestee, the accessibility of the items and their
nature.
Id. at 513, 256 A.2d at 389.
27. 228 So. 2d 417 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).
28. Id. at 419.
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dant's control would depend on some of the above-mentioned or
similar criteria, none of which were discussed by the court.
Since not all evidence found eight feet from a defendant will be
within his immediate control, the court complicates the message
to the police, who must follow the new standards, by not explain-
ing why it held this evidence was in fact within the defendant's
immediate control. 2
9
Even more unfortunate than an unexplained decision is one
that incorrectly interprets the new standards. In one such
case,30 the defendant was arrested at the door to his motel room
and a search incident to the arrest turned up evidence in a suit-
case under the only bed in the room. The court held the search
was legal under Chimel, "[since] the search was confined to the
single motel room rented and actually occupied by the [defend-
ant]."3' This decision conflicts with Chimel in two ways. The
search in the instant case was permitted because the defendant
was in actual physical "possession" of the room. However, this
was one of the standards that Chimel specifically overruled.82 In
addition, Chimel prohibited searching through "closed or con-
cealed areas" in the room wherein the arrest occurs.3 8 Since the
court permited the search of the suitcase because the arrestee was
in "possession" of the room, it did not discuss whether the suitcase
was in the area of defendant's "immediate control." If it was not,
a search of the closed suitcase would violate Chimel even apart
from the court's mistaken "possession" argument.8 4
In another case,35 the defendant was sitting on her bed
when the police arrested her for a parole violation. The police
then searched her purse which had been lying on the floor next
to the bed and found heroin. The court, after correctly recog-
nizing how Chimel has limited the permissible area of search,
stated:
29. If the Holmes court found eight feet to be within the defend-
ant's control, would it have found the same if the distance had been nine
feet or 15 feet? "[Dhifferences . . . of degree must not be capricious; the
differences must permit rational classification." United States v. Rab-
inowitz, 339 U.S. at 79 (dissenting opinion). Obviously there can be no
rational classification without the reasons for so classifying.
30. Brewer v. State, 228 So. 2d 582 (Miss. 1969).
31. Id. at 584.
32. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
33. 395 U.S. at 763.
34. In Scott v. State, 7 Md. 505, 513, 256 A.2d 384, 389 n.6 (1969) the
court stated: "It would seem that a seizure of a weapon or destructible
evidence in a locked drawer in the immediate presence of the arrestee
in the literal sense would be beyond the permissible scope of a search.
35. People v. Belvin, 275 Cal. App. 2d 955, 80 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1969).
[Vol. 55:10111018
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[It] is... evident that normal extensions of the person remain
subject to search and that articles customarily carried by an
arrested person fall within the area of his immediate control
In the category of such articles we include a woman's purse, a
man's wallet, a jacket, a hat, an overcoat, and a brief case in
use at the time of the arrest, even though these articles may not
be on the immediate person of the arrestee at the moment of ar-
rest.. .36
Thus the court concluded that since the defendant's purse was
in use by her at the time of her arrest, "[it] legally amounted to
an extension of her person" and could be searched whether the
defendant was in the room or not.3 7 If, as this court seems to
permit, the particular item can be searched whether or not it is in
the defendant's "immediate control," the police would be able
to walk through rooms other than those in which the arrest oc-
curred in order to find the item.38 This decision, therefore, cir-
cumvents Chime's specific prohibition against routinely search-
ing rooms other than those in which an arrest occurs or even
other areas of the same room that are not under the defendant's
"immediate control."
Since police practices are affected to a greater extent by the
lower courts' interpretation of the new standards than by the
standards themselves, an unexplained or incorrect interpretation
of the standards hinders the police in obtaining the information
necessary to rectify those practices the Supreme Court thought
questionable.
V. SEARCHES OF PERSONS OTHER THAN
THE ARRESTEE
Up to this point the cases discussed have involved only
searches of the arrestee. However, situations do arise in which
other persons are present at the arrest. The danger then is that
an arrestee may be able to utilize another person to obtain a
weapon or to destroy evidence from an area outside of his "im-
mediate control." This situation arose in United States v. Mana-
rite.39 In that case two defendants challenged a search of their
apartment and a seizure of obscene matter found therein. The
challenge was based solely on the ground that the officers went
36. Id. at 958, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 959, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
38. One potential problem, for example, is that a handbag may be
in a closet which would permit the police to enter the closet. Further-
more, it may not be evident which handbag was then in use and the
police may have to open more than one bag in order to find the cor-
rect one.
39. 314 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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beyond the permissible scope of search. One of the defendants
was in the custody of an officer when the two of them entered
the living room. At that point the officer noticed two men
sleeping on two different couches. The two men, who were not
recognized by the officer, were directed to stand. One stood
about two feet from a small table and the other about three feet
from another table. Both were facing the defendant who was
standing across the room from them. Neither man was restrained
in any manner. The officer, aware that weapons had already
been found on the premises, and seeing some of the evidence he
was looking for on top of one of the tables, proceeded to search
the two tables. The court held:
[It] was entirely reasonable and absolutely necessary for
the safety of the law enforcement officials to consider the two
men as [the defendant's] possible agents or accomplices, in ef-
fect as extensions of [defendant's] physical presence, construct-
ively placing [the defendant] within reach of the two . . . ta-
bles. Moreover, since a gun and ammunition had already been
found in the apartment, it was not unlikely that other weapons
would be secreted throughout the apartment ...
The searches of, and seizures from, the ... tables which
were within the reach of the two unidentified men and there-
fore could be reasonably considered to be in the construc-
tive reach of the arrested person, were properly incident to the
lawful arrest as defined in Chimel .... There was no search
of any room which was not occupied by the [defendants] ...
In fact, they did not conduct a search of any area of the living
room or the . . . bedroom [wherein the arrest occurred] which
was not proximate to either [of the defendants] or the unidenti-
fied men....
They made a quick search of the bathroom before [one de-
fendant] went in to change [clothes] and a search of one of the
living room chairs before [the other defendant] sat down ... .40
The facts of Manarite illustrate the most serious consequence
of the Chimel decision: the arrestee's spouse or accomplice may
destroy evidence in any area not legally subject to search. In
Chimel, for example, the police were waiting for the defendant
in his home and arrested him at the door. A thorough search
followed in which the police required the wife to move the con-
tents of drawers in order to facilitate the search. Much evidence
was found in this manner.41  Had the police simply arrested
Chimel without searching the house, his wife would probably
have destroyed the evidence. Even though the police may be
able to search the area within the "immediate control" of the wife
if she was "an extension of the arrestee's physical presence," as in
40. Id. at 615-16.
41. 395 U.S. at 753-54.
[Vol. 55: 10111020
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Manarite,42 they could not search the entire house simply because
the wife was present. To do so would, in effect, revive the stan-
dards of Harris and Rabinowitz.43
VI. THE PLAIN SIGHT DOCTRINE AND THE
CHIMEL RATIONALE
The standards in Chimel restricting the permissible scope of
search only apply to searches made incident to arrest. Thus the
police can justify a broader search for evidence under alterna-
tive bases for search. Two obvious alternatives are consent and
warrant searches. In most cases, however, the plain sight doc-
trine is the only viable alternative to incident-to-arrest searches. 4
The plain sight doctrine allows the seizure of objects in plain
sight of the officer if he has a right to be in a position to see
them.45 Concomitantly, the plain sight doctrine does not apply
where the officers' presence is illegal.46 The purpose of this rule
is to allow the police to seize any evidence which they might
otherwise be forced to disregard when the evidence is in open
view. 4 7
The decision in Chimel proscribes searches outside the
area [of defendant's] immediate control ...
There is no... justification... for searching through...
desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas [in the room
where the arrest occurs].48
Since something in plain sight is by definition not "closed or
concealed," and since courts have held that something seized in
plain sight is not the product of a search, Chimel impliedly seems
to permit the seizure of something in plain view in the room in
42. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
43. See text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
44. This discussion relates only to searches in buildings. An ad-
ditional exception relating to automobile searches is discussed in that
section. See text accompanying notes 71-78 infra.
45. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); Ker v. Cali-
fornia, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963).
46. United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1957).
47. Courts have generally circumscribed having to decide the
"reasonableness" of taking something observed in plain view, by hold-
ing that it is not a search, but only a seizure. Harris v. United States,
390 U.S. at 236 (1968). However, the obviousness of something in
plain view is a form of exigency in the sense that failure to act imme-
diately when confronted with the evidence in this manner may re-
sult in its disappearance. United States v. Thweatt, No. 22,772 (D.C. Cir.
June 30, 1970), at 8.
48. 395 U.S. at 763.
19711 1021
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
which the arrest occurs, even if it is not in the area of defendant's
"immediate control. '4 9
There is a question, however, whether the policy underlying
Chimel-that warrantless searches are inherently unreasonable
except when certain exigent circumstances exist-would per-
mit the seizure of items in plain sight in any room that it was
not essential for the police to enter, either to make the arrest or
to get to the room where the arrest is to be made. The argu-
ment against permitting the seizure of items in plain sight in
any room is that the plain sight doctrine would be transformed
from its present function into an alternative method of search.
The doctrine itself prohibits seizures where the officers' pres-
ence is illegal.50
It can be maintained, however, that the underlying rationale
behind search incident to arrest-preventing the police from
being harmed and preventing destruction of the evidence-would
permit the police an over-all view of the other rooms in the
premises and thereby make their presence in any room legal.
This over-all view would not be a detailed search, as permitted by
Chimel in the area of defendant's immediate control, but would
consist of a cursory glance in each room to insure that there were
no accomplices on the premises that could harm the police. Dicta
in People v. Mann5' would permit exactly that result. In that
case the defendant was arrested in the entryway of his apart-
ment. Since he was not fully dressed, the police directed him to
do so and they followed him to the bedroom. There they found
the defendant's accomplice in the crime, and in open view on
top of a bureau, were the stolen items. The court upheld the
seizure of the evidence, holding the statement by the Chimel
Court, that there can be "[no] point of rational limitation, once
49. A number of lower courts, in decisions subsequent to Chimel,
have held that the plain sight rule is still valid. In United States v.
Badilla, 434 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1970), a narcotics agent knocked on the
defendant's motel door and arrested him when he opened it, observing
simultaneously a packet which appeared to be heroin. The defendant
then indicated that there was additional heroin in the kitchen. Both
were seized by the agent. At trial, the defendant claimed both seizures
were unreasonable within the meaning of Chimel. The appellate court
upheld the seizure of the packet in open view basing its decision on the
plain sight rule and holding that this was not unreasonable within the
meaning of Chimel. It held the seizure of the heroin from the kitchen
reasonable but stated that it would have been unreasonable under Chi-
mel had the defendant not consented to the seizure. See also United
States v. Avey, 428 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1970).
50. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
51. 61 Misc. 2d 107, 305 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1969).
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the search is allowed to go beyond the area from which the per-
son arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary items,15 2 in-
applicable in this situation.53 It is only logical that this is con-
sistent with Chimel because the defendant may easily obtain a
weapon or destructible evidence, or possibly escape, if the police
allow him to leave their view once he is under arrest. 4 However,
the court went further and stated that even if the defendant had
been dressed, the police had the right to look around and seize
any evidence in open sight. The court concluded:
Arrest gives the police the right to search the person and the
immediate surroundings of the arrestee; surveillance of a
prisoner and the right to check for confederates or accom-
plices extends that right to permit the police an. over-all view
of the other rooms in the premises, with a concomitant right to
seize evidence or weapons in plain sight.55
Since Chimel restricts the permissible scope of search to the
area within the arrestee's "immediate control,"55 it was inevit-
able that problems would arise when police believed that ac-
complices of the arrestee might be on the premises in areas out-
side of the defendant's "immediate control." This problem was
evident in United States v. Manarite57 in which the court held
that two men, who were in the presence of the arrestee and not
under arrest, were "extensions of his physical presence"55 and al-
lowed the police to search them and the area under their 'immedi-
ate control." The search was allowed in order to prevent the men
from obtaining a weapon or destructible evidence. This ration-
ale can be extended to permit the police an over-all view of the
other rooms in the premises without exceeding the parameters es-
tablished in Chimel; in fact, the standards in Chimei provide the
foundation for this expansion. Chimel prohibits "routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs
. . . .59 It exempts from this prohibition "well-recognized ex-
ceptions.""0 The purpose of allowing the police to search inci-
dent to arrest in the first instance is to prevent them from being
harmed and to prevent evidence from being destroyed. These
52. 395 U.S. at 766.
53. "This case calls for a further refinement of the Chimel doctrine,
for here there was no search, in the real sense of the word, . . . but
[only] a seizure." 61 Misc. 2d at 112, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
54. In addition, most courts would not consider this a search.
See note 47 supra.
55. 61 Misc. 2d at 113, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 232-33 (emphasis added).
56. 395 U.S. at 763.
57. See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
58. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
59. 395 U.S. at 763.
60. Id.
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justifications end outside the area of defendant's "immediate con-
trol," which, by definition, is the area from which the arrestee
cannot obtain a weapon or destructible evidence. However, just
as another person in the same room as the arrestee can be "an ex-
tension of the arrestee's physical presence," justifying a search of
the area under his "immediate control,"' 1 so may a search of an-
other room be justified in order to locate these other persons.
There is a greater possibility of an accomplice in another room,
of whom the police are unaware, destroying evidence or harm-
ing an officer than there is from an accomplice in plain view of
the officer. To prevent the destruction of evidence or harm to
the officer an over-all view of the other rooms in the premises
should be permitted.62
VII. SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE
It is unclear whether the new criteria enunciated in Chimel
will also apply to automobiles since they have traditionally
been subject to different tests of reasonableness under the fourth
amendment because of their mobility. Although the Court only
briefly alluded to automobile searches in Chimel,3 the policy
underlying search incident to arrest favors its application to au-
tomobiles. In Preston v. United States,64 the Court disallowed a
61. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
62. In his dissenting opinion in Chimel, Mr. Justice White pointed
out that an effect of Chimel would be to decrease the possibility of ob-
taining any evidence, since in many cases an accomplice or spouse of the
arrestee will destroy evidence while a warrant is being obtained. Jus-
tice White suggested that where probable cause to search is independ-
ently established and would be sufficient to obtain a warrant for a
broader search for evidence, the arrest is a sufficient exigent circum-
stance to justify further police action. He stated that if in fact there
were no probable cause to search, there could be adequate redress in a
judicial hearing where any illegally seized evidence could be excluded.
395 U.S. at 780-82. The majority, however, could not accept the view
that fourth amendment interests are vindicated so long as the evidence
seized without probable cause is not admitted into evidence. It said that
the fourth amendment was not only to redress grievances but also to
prevent unreasonable searches, and thus it refused to allow a search on
independently existing probable cause. 395 U.S. at 766 n.12.
63. The Court said:
Our holding today is of course entirely consistent with the
recognized principle that, assuming the existence of probable
cause, automobiles and other vehicles may be searched without
warrants "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant be-
cause the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality orjurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
395 U.S. at 764 n.9.
64. 376 U.S. 364 (1964). Preston was one of the major cases re-
lied on by the Court as authority for Chimel.
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search of the defendant's car as incident to arrest, because the
search took place when the defendant was already in jail and the
car was in custody in the police garage. The Court held:
[t]here was no danger that any of the men arrested could
have used any weapons in the car or could have destroyed any
evidence of a crime... . Nor... was there any danger that
the car would be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction.! 5
The only reasoned distinction, then, between a search of a
residence and the search of an automobile is that in some cir-
cumstances a car is mobile and can be removed from the juris-
diction. If, as was recognized in Preston, the car is not truly
mobile, there is no reason to make this distinction and the stand-
ards in Chimel should apply to automobile searches.
The question then becomes, can an entire car be under the
"immediate control" of an arrestee? Under Harris and Rabino-
witz the entire car could be searched since it was in the defen-
dant's "possession" or "control," as those terms had previously
been construed.68 This result would probably not be obtained
under Chimel. In a case on point, 7 the defendant, after being
stopped by police, got out of his car and approached the officers'
vehicle. One of the officers frisked the defendant while the other
searched his car incident to the arrest. A gun was found in the
glove compartment. The court held that under the standards es-
tablished in Chimel there was no justification for searching the
glove compartment of the car since it was not "'within his reach,'
nor in plain view."68 The obvious rationale behind this decision
is simply that since the defendant was in police custody, he could
not obtain a weapon or destructible evidence from the car and
for that same reason, the car was not in fact mobile.
A similar result was reached in Colosimo v. Perini.60 In that
case, the defendant was arrested after he was observed stealing
from cars parked at an airport. After he and his accomplice had
been taken to the police station, a key was discovered in the rear
seat of the police car. When the defendants denied having any
knowledge of the key, one of the officers, without first obtain-
ing a search warrant, returned to the airport parking lot where
65. Id. at 368.
66. See, e.g., People v. Roland, 270 Cal. App. 2d 639, 76 Cal. Rptr.
72 (1969), in which the search of a trunk of a car after the arrest was
permitted.
67. Fields v. State, 463 P.2d 1000 (Okla. 1969). See note 16 supra
for a discussion of this case.
68. Id. at 1004.
69. 415 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 399 U.S.
519 (1970).
19711 1025
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
their car had remained in police custody. The officer then
opened the trunk and seized the evidence. The lower court, re-
lying on Rabinowitz, concluded that the search was valid. The
appellate court reversed, stating:
With the person ... suspected of crime and the automobile
to be searched both in police custody, the precipitous action of a
warrantless search is no longer justified. It is true that in
Preston the vehicle was searched at a point away from the
scene of the arrest, while here the vehicle remained at the place
where the defendant was arrested. Chimel, however, per-
suades us that such factual distinction is not of controlling
importance.70
The conditions under which automobiles may be searched,
however, recently came under review by the Supreme Court in
Chambers v. Marony7' and its decision in that case may prevent
application of the Chimel standards in this area. The issue in
Chambers concerned the admissibility of evidence seized from a
car in which the defendant was riding at the time of the arrest.
After the defendant was arrested the car was taken to a police
station and there thoroughly searched without a warrant.72 The
Court, citing Preston,73 held that the search could not be justi-
fied as incident to arrest,74 but could be justified as an exception
to the warrant requirement, established in Carroll v. United
States,75 by which it is possible for a police officer to search a car
if he has probable cause to believe that there is contraband pres-
70. Id. at 806. The court concluded that Chimel persuaded it that
Preston was controlling in this case and therefore it did not decide
whether Chimel was to be retroactively applied. The court first had to
distinguish its decision in Crawford v. Bannan, 336 F.2d 505, 507 (6th
Cir. 1964), in which it held a search valid on facts very similar to
Perini. In Crawford, the court held, believing that Rabinowitz justified
such a holding, that the fact that at the time of the search there was no
danger of harm to the officers or loss of evidence of the crime was not
of controlling importance if the search was "reasonably contemporane-
ous" with the arrest. It distinguished Crawford on the basis of "further
illumination" of the Preston decision by the Court in Chimel.
The court in Perini did not mention who owned the car searched,
but it noted that the defendant, having been charged with the posses-
sion of burglar tools, was a "person aggrieved" by the search of the car
and had standing to object to the search. 415 F.2d at 804.
71. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
72. Id. at 44.
73. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
74. There are . . . alternative grounds arguably justifying the
search of the car in this case. In Preston . . . the arrest was
for vagrancy; it was apparent that the officers had no cause to
believe that evidence of crime was concealed in the auto. ...
Here the situation is different, for the police had probable cause
to [search].
399 U.S. at 47.
75. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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ent.76 No arrest is necessary.7 7 The Court added:
Carrol. .. [does not] require or suggest that in every conceiv-
able circumstance the search of an auto even with probable
cause may be made without a... warrant .. . But... the
opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable.
Where this is true, as in Carroll and the case before us now, if
- an effective search is to be made at any time, either the
search must be made immediately without a warrant or the car
itself must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever
period-is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search.
.. Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the
police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for
a search.
78
Despite these cautionary words, if a search can be made in the
instant case where the car was in police custody and thus not
movable, the occupants were in jail and could not escape or de-
stroy the evidence and the evidence seized was not contraband,
when can a search not be made? The majority emphasized that
these other "conceivable circumstances" did not include cases
which involved state statutes which permit seizure of a car if it
was an instrumentality of the crime 70 nor did they involve an
abandoned or stolen vehicle.8 0 There is an obvious discrepancy
in the Court's statement that the car in the instance case was
movable, as was the car in Carroll. In Carroll, the car was on
the highway where it was stopped and searched contemporane-
ously. In the instant case the police had custody of the car and
76. 399 U.S. at 48.
-77. Despite the existence of this rule, police have invariably re-
lied instead, on search incident to arrest, consent search, or the rule
which permits a routine inventory of a vehicle lawfully taken into po-
lice possession. The area in which the Carroll rule has been most often
used has been to allow officers to search abandoned vehicles.
Perhaps the most significant reason why the Carroll rule is as little
used as it is lies in the fact that the power to search the vehicle does
not also include the right to search the occupants, usually a practical
necessity. L., TiFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECnoN oF
CRunm 173 (1967). The Supreme Court has indicated that assuming
there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband "we see
no ground for expanding the ruling in the Carroll case to justify ...
[a search of the occupants of a car] as incident to the search of a car."
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948).
78. - 399 U.S. at 50-51. In his dissent in Chambers, Mr. Justice
Harlan noted that the Court disregarded the fact that Carroll and each
of the Court's decisions upholding a warrantless vehicle search on its
authority, involved a search for contraband and that although subse-
quent dicta have omitted this limitation, the Carroll decision had not un-
til this cas6 been held to authorize a general search of a vehicle for
evidence of crime, without a warrant, in every case where probable
cause exists (citations omitted). Id. at 62 n.7.
79. E.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
80. "The question here is whether probable cause justifies a war-
rantless search in the circumstances presented." 399 U.S. at 49-50 n.7.
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could have obtained a warrant for the search.81
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Chambers, noted that the
Court's many decisions in this area imposed a general principle
that a search without a warrant is not justified by the mere
knowledge of the officers showing probable cause and that any
exemption from this rule must be no broader than necessitated
by the circumstances. In Chimel, for example, the Court rec-
ognized that an arrest creates an emergency situation justifying a
warrantless search of the arrestee's person and of the area from
within which he may gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence. Since the exigency causing this exception extends
only that far, the search may go no further. Similarly, in Terry
v. Ohio8 2 it was held that a warrantless search in a "stop and
frisk" situation must be strictly limited by the exigencies which
justify its initiation and any intrusion beyond what is necessary
to protect the personal safety of the officer is forbidden.88 The
purpose of the moving vehicle exception is to prevent the evi-
dence from being lost or destroyed by being removed from the
jurisdiction. Thus the car's mobility is an exigency that permits
a warrantless search, assuming the presence of independently
existing probable cause. However, when the car cannot be re-
moved from the jurisdiction, the exigency justifying the war-
rantless search does not exist and a warrant should be required.
Although the Court used Preston as its authority for disal-
lowing the search as incident to arrest, the Court's decision in
Chambers has effectively limited the value of Preston. Two other
decisions that were vacated and remanded in light of Chambers
help illustrate this effect. In one case,84 the defendant's car was
stopped by a sheriff and he was arrested as he emerged from the
81. In Preston a search was not permitted in a very similar situa-
tion and the Court expressly stated that there was no available excep-
tion that would have permitted the search without a warrant. 376 U.S.
at 367. In Chambers, the Court tried to distinguish Chambers from
Preston on its facts. In dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
The Court's reliance on the police custody of the car as its rea-
son for holding "that the search of the car without a warrant
failed to meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment" . . . can only have been based on the premise
that the more reasonable course was for the police to retain
custody of the car for the short time necessary to obtain a
warrant. The Court expressly did not rely, as suggested [in this
case], on the fact that an arrest for vagrancy provided "no
cause to believe that evidence of crime was concealed in the
auto."
399 U.S. at 65.
82. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
83. See 399 U.S. at 61-62.
84. Wood v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated and re-
manded, 399 U.S. 520 (1970).
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car. The defendant was searched and a stolen check was found,
but the car was not searched at that time. Shortly after the de-
fendant was jailed, a highway patrolman noticed the defendant's
abandoned car alongside the highway. After obtaining the
keys from the sheriff, the patrolman drove the car to the jail
where approximately twenty minutes after the defendant had
been arrested, it was searched for the first time. Many stolen
checks were found. The appellate court, relying on Chimel,
had reversed the conviction. In another case,85 a police officer
observed guns in plain sight in a man's car and arrested him No
search was made at the scene of the arrest. The entire car was
later searched at the police station after the defendant had been
arrested.
Neither state attempted to use the Carroll rule to validate
the search. Both attempted to use the search incident to arrest
doctrine and both were rejected by appellate courts. The
searches in these cases, and in Perini, are typical of those which
Preston and Chimel have prohibited. The decision in Chambers
thus greatly weakens their restraining effect.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The new standards defining the permissible scope of search
incident to arrest permit a search of the arrestee and the area
within his immediate control. In addition, a search of the area
under the immediate control of another person, not under arrest,
probably will be permitted if that person is deemed to be an ex-
tension of the arrestee's physical presence.80 It is also possible
that the police may be permitted an over-all view of the other
rooms in the premises. This view would be restricted to a cur-
sory- glance through each room for possible accomplices. A de-
tailed search outside the area of defendant's immediate control
would not be permitted.
It appears that these new standards will also apply to auto-
motive searches and this should stop the police from completely
searching the car every time they make an arrest. It should also
help eliminate the practice of making arrests for minor offenses
simply to justify an otherwise impermissible search. The excep-
tion established in Carroll, permitting a search on independently
85. Heffley v. Hocker, 420 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1969), vacated and re-
manded, 399 U.S. 521 (1970).
86. The only case discussing this situation is United States v.
Manarite, 314 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See text accompanying notes
39-43 supra.
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existing probable cause, should only apply if the car is truly mo-
bile and can be moved from the jurisdiction. 8 7 If the car is not
in fact mobile, the justification for an immediate search evapor-
ates since a search warrant can be obtained. Thus, a reconsid-
eration of the ruling in Chambers by the Supreme Court appears
to be warranted.8 8
87. In his dissent in Chambers, Justice Harlan noted that the fourth
amendment proscribes unreasonable seizures as well as searches and
suggested that the car could be seized for the short period necessary
to obtain a warrant, which would involve less of a violation of privacy
than a complete search of the car. 399 U.S. at 63. The majority con-
ceded this possibility, but stated that the question as to which involved
the greater violation of privacy, the search or the seizure, was debat-
able. Id. at 51-52.
88. United States v. Mehciz, No. 25,868 (9th Cir. January 11, 1971),
would seem to be an ideal case for a reconsideration of Chambers. In
that case, the defendant, who was carrying a small suitcase, was ar-
rested as he disembarked from an airplane. Following the arrest,
The officers [who had obtained information that the defendant
would be arriving with illegal drugs] took the suitcase and
handcuffed [the defendant] so that there was no danger that
he would get to the suitcase, obtain a weapon or destroy any
evidence that might be found inside. Id. at 2.
The defendant argued that a search warrant should have been obtained
since the suitcase was not "within his immediate control" as that term
was construed in Chimel.
The court, after stating that "[it was] not unimpressed by the logical
conclusion which [defendant] draws from his interpretation of the
Chimel rule . . . ," upheld the conviction in light of Chambers. Id. at
3. Its reasoning was as follows:
The Court in Chambers expressly rejected the suggestion[that the automobile should have been impounded without a
search until a search warrant could be obtained] saying that
"[f]or constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on
the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting theprobable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand car-
rying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given prob-
able cause to search, either course is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment." 399 U.S. at 52. We believe that the
factors underlying the decision in Chambers, i.e., mobility and
the lack of undue intrusion, apply with at least equal force to
the suitcase involved here.
There is little doubt but that the rule of Chimel is appar-
ently not applicable to automobile searches per the decisionin Chambers. The Supreme Court has expressly held that "for
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitu-
tional difference between houses and cars." While we are not
necessarily of the view that Chimel is limited to house searches,
we think it only reasonable to conclude that there is a cor-
responding "constitutional difference" between a house and a
suitcase. Id. at 3-4.
The court also attempted to justify its decision on the basis of Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), which the court said was fac-
tually indistinguishable from the situation in Mehciz. It noted that
Draper was mentioned in Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760 n.4, and was not over-
ruled therein.
In Chimel, the Court rejected the view that a search on independ-
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ently existing probable cause should be permitted, 395 U.S. at 764 but
it noted that there was an exception to this rule for "automobiles and
other vehicles... because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Id. n.9.
See text accompanying notes 63-68 supra. Although the reasoning behind
Chambers is-open to question (see text accompanying notes 71-83 supra)
it had not been applied to anything other than a vehicle until this case.
The question of whether a suitcase in police custody is mobile, es-
pecially when its owner is also in police custody, will not be discussed.
The additional question of whether there is a constitutional difference
between a house and a car will also not be discussed. These questions
would not have arisen if Chambers had been more clearly reasoned.
Chambers caused the confusion in Mehciz, in which that court stated
that Chambers made Chimel inapplicable to cars. The Chambers deci-
sion was based on the doctrine of independently existing probable cause;
Chambers specifically stated that the search could not be justified as
incident to arrest. 399 U.S. at 47.
One explanation for this decision is that because of the nature and
amount of the evidence seized-12,000 tablets of LSD-the court was
unwilling to exclude the evidence because of simple police error. This
would account for the court's attempted reliance on Draper, which was
cited in Chimel simply as an example of the divergent opinions that
had resulted from Rabinowitz.
Judge Ely, dissenting in Mehciz, noted that the opportunity to search
was not fleeting and that the immediate search of the suitcase was a
greater intrusion than was the search of a car in Chambers. He con-
cluded:
It is, I hope, unnecessary for me to add that I hold no sym-
pathy for the [defendant]. Admittedly, my approach is con-
servative, but I cannot conscientiously ignore the tradition
that judges of inferior courts are compelled, whether they like
to do so or not, to apply the controlling principles of the Su-
preme Court. Our function is not to apply the law as we might
like it to be, or that we may speculate that it may become, but
to apply it as it is.
United States v. Mehciz, No. 25,868 (9th Cir. January 11, 1971) at 10.
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